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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD HAYMORE AND
ELAINE H. HAYMORE

Plaintiffs,
-vs.REUBEN J. LEVINSON AND
YETTA LEVINSON,

Case

No.
No. 8793

Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 7, 1955, the parties executed a written
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase certain
real property located at 4210 Holloway Drive, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (Ex. P1). Line 10 of this agreement specified:
"the following personal property shall also be included as
part of the property purchased: ITEMS ON EXHIBIT
'A'." The exhibit "A" referred to is Exhibit P . . 2. herein,
which was a document prepared by the real estate sales
company for the purpose of effecting a sale of this same
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property to some other persons and was not prepared for
the sale to the defendants and was never signed by the
plaintiffs herein (TRS 91 and 111). The plaintiffs and de . .
fendants did not discuss the sale of the property at any
time prior to signing exhibit 1. The plaintiffs conveyed the
property to the defendants on December 1, 1955 (TRS
122), and the defendants gave a mortgage to Prudential
Insurance Company of America to secure a loan to them
(TRS 93). The $.3,000.00, representing the unpaid bal. .
ance of the purchase price, was deposited with_ the Securi. .
ty Title and Abstract Company, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The plaintiffs set about doing the work set out in Exhibit
P. . 2, and in the process did work not mentioned therein,
until Mrs. Levinson demanded that work not listed on
Exhibit 2 be done and plaintiff refused to do the work.
Defendant then ordered plaintiff out of the house and re . .
fused to let him do anymore work (Ex. 3, TRS 5 and 106).
There was conflict in the evidence which was resolved
by the trial court in his memorandum decision and the
Findings of Fact.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS CONSTRUe. .
TION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE P4~R. .
TIES.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS
THAT NO STRUCTURAL DEFECTS EXISTED AND
THAT THERE WERE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS CONSTRUC-TION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PAR-TIES.
The appellants assume that there is a clear, unequivo-cal written agreement by which the plaintiff undertook
to do certain work to the individual personal subjective
satisfaction of ~ppellants. This is not necessarily so.
The Earnest money Receipt (Ex. P --1) contains the
words: "Escrow money to be released on satisfactory com-pletion of work not to exceed sixty ( 60) days from the
date of possession." The trial court made the following
decision (R. 155):
"The provision 'on satisfactory completion of the
work' means: The items in Exhibit 2 to be done
in accord with the form and plans of the structure
originally planned and in a good workmanlike man-ner. It does not require that the purchaser say 'I am
fully satisfied.' ''
In 17 C.J.S., Sec. 495 (e) under the sub--heading "Applica-tion to Building and Construction Contract" it is said:
"nevertheless, such a provision is more often con-strued as not making the owner's declaration of
dissatisfaction conclusive, but as requiring merely
the performance of the work by the builder in such
substantial manner as ought reasonably to satisfy
the owner."
In Utah this court has defined the word "satisfactory"
as follows:
"the word 'satisfactory' is defined as relieving the
mind from doubt or uncertainty, adequate for the
purpose . . . . "
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State v. Brooks, 101 U. 584, 126 P2d 1044
and in another case where the written contract made one
party "the sole judge" of the amount of performance to
be rendered, the Utah Court has made the party conform
to a standard of reasonableness. The Court said:
"The plaintiff's 'sole judgment' in the matter could
not be capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary .... "
13th & Washington Corp. v. Neslen, et al 254 P2d
847, -U-.
In th~ case before the court the written document does
not specify the person who is to be satisfied by the work,
and it is generally held that in doubtful cases the court
will usually construe the contract as meaning sufficient
performance as will satisfy a reasonable man in the prom~
isor's position, and especially is this true where labor and
material are to be expended on another's property.
Robie v. Wheeler Shipyard, 3 N.Y. S2d 813, 167
Misc. 279
Shepherd v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., C C A
Texas, 74 F2d 180
The courts generally in the field of construction con~
tracts hold that substantial performance by the builder
will support a recovery even though the contract requires
the work to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner.
9 Am. Jur., Sec. 40, reads in part as follows:
"The American Courts are united in holding that
a substantial performance of a building contract
will support a recovery ... three reasons are given
for the rule: -First, since the owner must receive
the fruits of the builders labors, it is deemed equi~
table to require the former to pay for \vhat he gets.
The second reason is that it is next to impossible
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for the builder to comply literally with all the mi-nute specifications in a building contract. The third
reason is that the parties are presumed to have im-pliedly agreed to do what is reasonable under all
of the circumstances with reference to the subject
of performance.
It has been generally held that the rule permits
recovery in case of substantial performance even
though the contract requires the work to be per-formed to the satisfaction of the owner, since his
judgment in the matter is to be exercised reasonably
and not arbitrarily."
Mr. Christensen, a witness for the plaintiffs, was quali-fied as an expert builder testified that he had made a care. .
ful inspection of the defendants property and that the
workmanship was above average and there was no evi-dence at all of inadequate footing (TRS 61 . .62).
The trial court made its findings of fact that "the
plaintiffs completed the major part of the items to be com. .
pleted . . . . defendants asked that additional work and
materials be furnished; plaintiff refused to do the additional
work and defendants refused to permit plaintiff to do any
further work on the house; .... " (R. 159)
It is a matter of fundamental contract law that "a
purchaser cannot set up a breach by the vendor, as a de . .
fense to an action for the purchase price, where by his
own acts he has made it impossible for vendor to perform"
(92 CJS p. 465).
The trial courts findings of fact and conclusions of
law are supported by substantial competent evidence and
by substantive law, respectively, and should be affirmed.
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Point II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS
THAT NO STRUCTURAL DEFECTS EXISTED AND
THAT THERE WERE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES.
The written document between the parties (Ex. P1)
supplemented by Ex. p. . show considerable ambiguity. The
documents purport to be for the sale of real property to. .
gether with certain personal property. Ex. p . . has language
in it which identified certain items of personal property;
sets out by inference certain materials to be furnished and
labor to be performed; and has words of warranty in it.
The exhibit p . . has never been signed by plaintiffs although
plaintiff referred to the "work" on Ex. p . . in his counter-offer contained in Ex. P. . t. On December 1, 1955 a final
deed of conveyance was given by plaintiffs to defendants
and the defendants took actual physical possession of the
property.

z

z

z

z

Ex. P--1 provided on Line 34 that upon execution of
the final contract that this Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase shall be abrogated.
It is also generally held upon the deliYery and accept-ance of the deed the preliminary contract of sale is merged
with the deed and the purchaser cannot set up the breach
of a condition as a defense to an action for the purchase
price:
"If the preliminary contract of sale has been n1erged
in a deed, the purchaser may not in the absence
of fraud, set up in defense the breach of a condi-tion in the contract that the property should be
delivered in a good condition.'' 92 CJS 469
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The pre--trial order (R--26) set out that "5. The de-fendants do not rely upon any oral warranties". The de-fendants in their brief contend that there was an "one
year guarantee against structural defects" (p. 6 of brief).
The only place such a phrase is found is in Ex. P ..2 which
the plaintiffs did not sign.
The pre--trial order specified: "Defendants contend that
the structural imperfections in the house are limited to
the carport and a failure to place sufficient footings under
the walls of the· house." ( R. 2 7)
The trial court made its Findings of Fact (R. 160)
"that there were not any structural defects and that there
were no express or implied warranties of plaintiffs to de-fendants as to the condition of the house."
The Findings of Fact by the trial court are to be sus-tained if there is substantial competent evidence to support
them.
Mr. Roberg, a witness for defendants, testified ( 1 24-26, TRS 22)
"as far as 'structural defects,' I am not sure. There
is shrinkage cracks, or settling cracks, or there is
cracks through the floor."
Mr. Roberg then went on (TRS 23) to testify that it is
not unusual to get shrinkage cracks in concrete due to
temperature changes, and that concrete itself is porous and
permits water to come through.
Mr. Christensen, a witness for plaintiffs, was qualified
as a building expert and testified (TRS 59, line 29)

Q. Did you examine that patio area for structural
defects?
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A. Yes.

Q. Did you find any structural defects?
A. No.
Mr. Glen Tucker, a witness for plaintiffs, was quali,
fied as an expert on concrete construction and testified
(line 28 TRS 100 er seq.) :

Q. Did you see any evidence of structural defect in
the patio slab, in its construction?
A. I did not.
The record is devoid of any evidence at all as to in. .
adequate footings for the walls of the house.
The findings of the trial court are well sustained by
substantial competent evidence.

CONCLUSION
It is respecdully submitted that the trial court did
not err in its construction of the agreement between the
parties, and that the court's findings that there was not
any express or implied warranties as to the condition of
the house, and its further findings that there were not
any strucrural defects in the house are all sustained by
law and evidence and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER M. LOWE,
Attorney for Respondents
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